Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
UR interest is in large distributed systems in which 0 decision makers or agents must make good, though not necessarily optimal, decisions. It is assumed that the cost of communication (e.g. transmitting, receiving, and interpreting messages) does not permit continuous communication between agents. As a result, each agent has its own view of the global state and is uncertain about the actual global state and the future actions of other agents [l]. Frequent communication decreases the uncertainty in global state but has a cost which can adversely affect the performance. The problem is to make good decisions with a low rate of communication of state information.
The goal is to improve performance by understanding and addressing this communication problem in distributed decision making. This is relevant to coordination which is informally defined as "the activity of independent agents making harmonious, non-conflicting decisions" which is similar in spirit to the definition in [2] . The difficulty in coordination is exacerbated by uncertainty in the information regarding agents' strategies, resources and constraints. As an example, an agent may apply a particular strategy when faced with limited resources and severe time constraints; a coordination problem arises if the view from another agent suggests that the first agent has ample resources or time. To capture these concepts, we present the simple model in Fig. 1 which has three components: local state information which is communicated via messages to other decision makers, a view of other agents' local variables received via messages, and a decision algorithm that operates on both sets of variables. Besides the input and output of messages, pulses are input to the decision maker as triggers for decision-making events and decisions are output as a result.
This overview of a decision maker lays the groundwork for a new model for distributed decision making called distributed
A. Mutually Conflicting Decisions
We are interested in a broad domain of applications in distributed systems which can exhibit a type of problem which we call mutually conjiicting decisions. These conflicting decisions are, by definition, in stark contrast to the "harmonious" decisions that result from successful coordination. A distributed semaphore protecting a shared variable is a simple example of such an application. Without the semaphore, the system may suffer disastrous consequences if multiple agents decide, at the same time, to access the shared variable. Of course, there is no penalty for one agent making this decision; it is only in the context of multiple agents making the same decision that the problem arises. The distributed semaphore eliminates the possibility of mutually conflicting decisions and is a guarantee of coordination. Similar examples arise in other applications. In a CSMA (carrier-sense multiple-access) communication environment, multiple senders may simultaneously sense that the channel is free, but because each sender decides, independently, to send a message at the same time, all of the message transmissions conflict. In a job scheduling environment, multiple job schedulers may decide to offload to the same lightly-loaded processor, hence the schedulers overload this processor and fail to balance the load across all processors [ 5 ] . A similar situation can arise in a communication routing system, where many messages may congest the previously least-loaded route.
Although these examples illustrate a problem when multiple agents make the same decision, mutually conflicting decisions occur when any set of collective decisions yields a poor result, and represent a failure in coordination. The "goodness" or "badness" of a set of collective decisions can be quantified by some metric relevant to the application. Different applications, or even different environments for the same application, can generate a different set of "payoffs" for each set of decisions. Fig. 2 illustrates the concept of "payoffs" for a set of collective decisions in the context of processor selection for job execution. (The numbers chosen for the payoffs might represent a variety of applications and, indeed, are similar to those described as the benevolent chicken game in [6] .) In this study, we focus on the decisions of two job schedulers (the decision makers or DMs) sending jobs to two processors. This distributed decision-making system is simple to understand, and yet is complex enough to illustrate the effects of delayed communication on performance.
Assume at one particular instant in time that both schedulers have a job to place and that both processors are currently idle. Obviously, as in our examples above, the schedulers should avoid selecting the same processor. The gross productivity (say on some scale of instructions executed per second) is the metric we have chosen to measure "goodness" and quantifies the useful work that can be performed on a job as a result of the collective decisions. The system is most productive if each decision maker selects a different processor to handle its job, since no processor will be idle, and overhead caused by jobs time-sharing a single processor is minimized. We quantify the amount of work done for each job as follows: if a job utilizes a processor by itself, it receives 5 units of work. If two jobs utilize the same processor, each job receives 2 units of work if on processor 1 (with 1 unit of work going to overhead due to timesharing), and 0 units of work if on processor 2 (which models a processor incapable of supporting two jobs simultaneously). Clearly, the best decision is for each decision maker to choose different processors, and the worst decision is for both decision makers to choose processor 2. In general, these payoffs model any problem where distributed decision makers are rewarded for making opposite decisions but are penalized in different degrees when they make identical decisions. See [7] for the determination of a set of payoffs for a robotic application.
B. Effects of Delayed Communication
We now outline the effects of uncertainty due to delayed communication on distributed decision making. Let us continue with our example of processor selection and assume that each scheduler uses a probabilistic strategy, that is, each scheduler has a probability of choosing processor 1 and a complimentary probability of choosing processor 2 . Probabilistic strategies are useful for three reasons: to break symmetry in distributed systems, to reduce the need for complex interactions among the agents, and to easily incorporate adaptive feedback mechanisms. The feedback mechanism should allow a potentially large number of agents to effectively coordinate the control of the shared resources and to respond to changing environmental conditions. The payoffs described above (gross productivity) are presented in matrix form in Fig. 3 , equivalent to a game-theoretic presentation. We assume that agents communicate their probabilistic strategies and that each agent has a view of the other agents' strategy at some time in the past. Consider the problem of making the best possible decision given the view, in Fig. 3 , of another agent's likelihood of choosing a particular processor; this determines the expected value of the game payoff, E[g (move] , for each decision. Based on the actual probabilities of the other agent, the best move (i.e. choice of processor) is to pick 2. The decision makers' view of the other agent's probabilities suggests that the best move is 1. The amount of communication delay affects the difference between the view and the actual probabilities, hence the decision maker may make poor choices based upon the aged information. Fig. 4 illustrates the resultant tradeoff in the quality of the decisions and the overhead necessary to process the communication. We assume that information is exchanged on a periodic basis. The decision quality is quantified by the gross productivity and the communication overhead is shown as a negative overhead on the productivity scale. Both quantities decrease with an increase in the period between information exchange. The hypothesis is that the net productiviry yields an optimal communication period that balances the two tendencies. 
II. RELATED WORK
The common-knowledge problem [8] , in which distributed decision makers cannot know the level of knowledge attained by others, shows that delayed communication can affect decision making. In particular, the effects of both the age and cost of communication are illustrated in the decentralized control of shared resources [l], [9] . A different approach examines rational agents without communication [ 101.
A directional heuristic is any mechanism which employs a hill-climbing strategy to increase expected utility [l] and, as such, can be used to implement adaptive coordination. We provide a simple game-theoretic model to examine these areas and the directional heuristic chosen for the current study is based on Zeanzing automata [3] , [4] . This mechanism is useful in complex, dynamic problem areas. For example, automata coadapt in a load balancing problem where the feedback is based on the global state of dynamic queues [ 1 11. Another model of learning automata in queueing systems [ 121 shows a sharp decrease in performance if the rate of state exchange exceeds a particular value; our simulations show a similar behavior. In [13] , agents make rational decisions regarding actions within a game but use learning automata strategies to make decisions concerning group formation. With sufficient communication, the agents make the more advantageous decision to work together. In [14] , learning automata interact in smaller groups to control a queueing system with delayed information.
Our concept of a directional heuristic is similar to a myopic tatonnement [ 151 which is a near-sighted adjustment assuming average behavior of the other player. This is an appropriate technique far a game of incomplete information. In Binmore's terminology, our games can be considered contests since preplay communication is not allowed. Also, a directional heuristic is an evolutive process rather than a eductive process since it is an iterative approach instead of careful preplay reasoning.
Our model is also related to the model of imperfect knowledge and delays within computational ecologies [16] , [17] , [18] . A large system of agents select resources based on aged information of other agents' resource selections. Linear stability analysis of the delay differential equations shows the delay necessary to initiate persistent oscillations [ 171.
In Section IV, our simulation results also show oscillatory behavior, but the distinction here is that we model the age of information as a time varying function rather than a constant. This is a more difficult analytic problem [19] , [20] but tends to be more relevant to distributed systems where information is broadcast on a periodic basis [12] . With constant age of information and stochastic payoffs, linear stability analysis can be applied to our game-theoretic model [21] .
III. THE MODEL
In Fig. 5 , a distributed game automaton (DGA) is a specific instance of the more general decision-making agent shown in Fig. 1 , both have the same components: local and view variables along with a decision-making algorithm. In particular, the local and view variables are probabilities, representing the likelihood of decisions, and the decision algorithm is based on a feedback mechanism. We have chosen this approach for many reasons. The strategy is fast, simple, approximates a deterministic strategy, and can break symmetry among agents. A simple feedback loop adjusts the randomization over time. The view of the other agents' probabilities allows a simple computation using expected payoff.
Consider a decision-making event of a DGA triggered by a clock pulse at time t E [0, n-11. In our application, this signals a scheduling event for work to be performed on a job and, in game-theoretic terms, this is the beginning of a new stage in the game. For simplicity, it is assumed that clock pulses are synchronized among all agents in the system, each a DGA.
Let us assume that agent i must decide between two actions ai(t) E {1,2}, representing the choice of processor to service the job. Agent i's local variable p ; ( t ) is the probability of choosing action 1, with 1 -p; (t) the probability of choosing the alternative action. Likewise, agent i has a view of agent j's local variable p j ( t ) . The local variables are communicated every P time units with a delay T along the channel connecting the agents. Therefore, the age of information, or lag, is a time varying function, (1)
and affects the view of other agents' probabilities:
The decision-making algorithm has two components, a reactive component which makes current decisions and a directional heuristic which affects future decisions. The reactive component responds to the pulse and flips a coin with weight pi ( t ) , the result is a; ( t ) . The directional heuristic in Fig. 5 is based upon learning automata [3] , [4] and has access to three types of information. First, it knows the action a;(t) of the agent, and the aged likelihood pf(t) of the actions of other agents. And last, the directional heuristic has knowledge of the expected performance in the application area; this "application" table, or game matrix, is indexed by the collective decisions of the agents.
We consider only a 2-agent system as an illustration of the effects of delayed communication. Formally, the agents are players and the game is a bimatrix D = {D12,D21}
representing the payoffs to player 1 and player 2, respectively. That is, given the players' action pair (a1, az), the payoffs are DL9a2 and DztLy2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
However, player i does not know the action of player j , but only an aged view of the likelihood of the action; this game of imperfect information arises due to the overhead restriction that agents cannot afford to communicate every decision. Also, player i does not know the payoff matrix for player j ; this game of incomplete information arises due to uncertainty in the environment of the other agent. However, since a player uses an adaptive mechanism operating on its own payoff matrix, the player does not require the additional information. A game-theoretic rational player, on the other hand, requires the additional information to determine the equilibrium solution.
The reward for player i at time t is the expected value of the game payoff g: where the learning constants a and b determine the size of the step in the direction of the increasing expected payoff.
The reward-penalty scheme ( L R -~) is defined by a = b and the reward-inaction scheme ( L R -I ) is defined by b = 0. The unique feature of our feedback mechanism is that it is based upon aged information, an appropriate model for a distributed system. Let each message exchange cost C units of productivity. The performance index M is the average payoff per player based upon the actual decisions minus the average communication cost C/P. The objective is to maximize this performance metric or, equivalently, the gain G which averages M over all time:
The next section shows how well the players perform based upon the period of communication P.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The experimental game D is the processor selection game presented in Section I. The game rewards opposite decisions and penalizes, in different degrees, identical decisions as shown in Figs. 2 and 3 . The game is structured such that opposite actions yield the Pareto-optimal value of (5, 5) . Players choosing identical actions receive (2, 2) or (0, 0) and we call this a symmetric game since D12 = DZ1.
Simulation results presented in Fig. 6 show the net payoff over time t for three different periods of communication ( P = 1, 10, 100; T = 1; C = 1; h = LR-P). Note that the payoff for the P = 1 case is lower by almost one unit than the payoff for the P = 10 case since the average overhead cost, based on C = 1, is higher. With information that is highly aged ( P = loo), the payoffs are much lower, and unstable. The next two figures detail these behaviors. Fig. 7 shows the divergence in strategies over time of both players for a small communication period ( P = 10) and that the players are successful in adaptive coordination. A probability of 1 indicates the player will always select the first action and a probability of 0 indicates the player will always select the second action. In the beginning, the players move to the (2, 2) payoff based on expected game payoffs. Because of the probabilistic strategy, one player tries the opposite action and receives a strong feedback allowing both players to reach the higher (5, 5 ) equilibrium. That is, the probabilistic strategy breaks the symmetry of the two global maxima. Fig. 8 shows the strategy probabilities over time of both players when the communication period is large (P = 100). The expected value of the game payoff is based on a very old view of the strategy of the other player. This causes each player to believe they are the only one altering their strategy probability to the opposite action. An oscillation occurs with twice the period of communication, as the game payoffs oscillate along the diagonal of (2, 2) and (0, 0). That is, the probabilistic strategy fails to break the symmetry of the two global maxima. With insufficient communication, the players are unable to avoid mutually conflicting decisions and, hence, are unsuccessful in adaptive coordination. We note that this oscillation due to large delay is also observed when using a dynamical systems theory [16] and that its period is also proportional to the delay. Huberman and Hogg call this the "it is so crowded that no one goes there" paradox [16] . A key distinction in our model is that the age of information is a time varying function.
The preceding experiment starts each player without a bias towards either action, i.e. both players favor the first action at 0.5. However, an initialization of 0 and 1 would keep both players at the (5, 5) equilibrium. there is a peak in the P = 20-80 range; but for high costs, the optimal communication period is infinity. In particular, the local peak payoff at P = 80, for the C = 500 plot, still has too much communication cost to justify any communication.
v. ANALYSIS
The simulation results in the preceding section suggest that performance degrades with insufficient communication.
In this section, we analyze the system to determine the circumstances for this degradation. However, to highlight the meaning and effectiveness of the analysis, we include additional simulation results at key points. The analysis makes two contributions. First, the analysis of learning automata can be quite difficult, but given the agents are operating in a stationary environment (since new messages do not arrive), we are able to provide predictions of the behavior. These predictions provide insight regarding logarithmic behavior, oscillatory behavior, the effects of constants, and absorbing states. (As noted in Section 11, the time varying nature of the delays makes for a more difficult problem than typically encountered in linear stability analysis [ 171.) Second, standard learning automata have a good property in that the expected payoff increases with each stage (see [3] for absolute expediency). This is not the case when delayed communication enters the model. Fig. 11 shows M ( p ) , the expected payoff (for the game in Fig. 3 ) as a function of the strategy probability, assuming that both players have the same probability at any stage. Simulations demonstrate that this assumption is reasonable if both players start with the same value, use the same heuristic and there is no communication during this period. With the assumption that the variance in Ap is zero (i.e. Ap = E[Ap]), our analytic result shows the existence of at least one circumstance in which learning automata fail to increase expected performance (the analysis is too difficult without this assumption). This failure is due entirely to the effects of delayed communication. Fig. 11 shows that an optimal payoff occurs at p = 0.625 for the game in Fig. 3 . We will show that p ( t ) increases monotonically for this game assuming no communication. If the lag in information is such that the players' probabilities are expected to exceed 0.625 then the payoff is expected to decrease.
The analysis proceeds in two stages; first, in Theorem 1 and its corollaries, we describe the expected behavior of Ap as a function of p at each time unit and then describe t ( p ) , that is, time as a function of probability. This provides a means for predicting how long a time interval is required for the players to achieve a particular probability. (For our example game in Fig. 3 , it takes 25 time units for the probability to increase monotonically from 0.5 to 0.625.) Second, in Theorem 2, we show that the expected payoff has a local maximum (say at p = 0.625). Together, these theorems show the existence of information lag and initialization circumstances that can lead to an expected decrease in the payoff.
The oscillation criterion established by [I71 differs from our approach; in particular, our results do not predict the global optimum just prior to oscillation. Instead, we show a lag where the expected value of the payoff decreases. This lag is inversely proportional to the learning constant of the directional heuristic.
Theorem I (Delta Probability): Let r, E [-1, +1] be the reward or penalty for action a E { 1 , 2 } and p = Pr[a = 11 (and 1 -p = Pr[a = 21). Let a , b E [0,1] be the learning constants for reward ( r , 2 0) and penalty (r, < 0), respectively. Given the general reward-penalty scheme (2) for the change in p over one time unit, the expected change in p is
Case r1 2 0 A rp 2 0: with probability p , we expect cy = 1 and p to change according to clause 1 of (2) . With probability 1 -p , we expect a = 2 and p to change by clause 2 of (2). Therefore,
A similar argument can be made for the following cases and we simplify the exposition.
Case r1 2 0 A rp < 0 : with probability p , use clause 1 and with probability 1 -p , use clause 4.
Case r1 < 0 A 7-2 2 0 : with probability p , use clause 3 and with probability 1 -p , use clause 2.
Case r1 < 0 A rp < 0 : with probability p , use clause 3 and with probability 1 -p , use clause 4.
The behavior of E [Ap] in Theorem 1 allows the prediction of t ( p ) for the restricted set of non-negative rewards. However, we will assume that there is no variance in the random variable Ap, that is, Ap = E [Ap] . We shall see that the resultant formula is still a good predictor and we will have demonstrated at least one point of failure in learning automata.
Corollary 1 (t(p)):
Given rewards r1 2 0 and 1-2 2 0 for actions 1 and 2, respectively, and a learning constant a that approaches 0, then the time t as a function of the probability p is Proofi In a small time step At, clause 1 of (3) implies A P = 47-1 -TZ)P(1 -P P t , (5) following the assumption that Ap = E[Ap]. Assuming a small constant a , t ( p ) follows from integration: which yields the result (4).
We now consider the effects of the initial probabilities (and views) being some small value S and ask what is the time required to alter states to 1 -S? This provides an estimate of one half the oscillation period where the minimum and maximum values of the probability are S and 1 -6, respectively. The alternation, from the view point of the player, is from state (0, 0) to state (5, 5), which yields a normalized feedback from -1 to +1, respectively. The other payoffs can be ignored since the views are static during this transition and S is small.
Corollary 2 (LR-I> Alter State):
Given LR-I rewards TI = +1 and r2 = -1 for actions 1 and 2, respectively, and a learning constant a that approaches 0, then the time required to alter the probability p from S to 1 -S is Proof: The time t ( p ) is the same as Corollary 1 but with clause 2 of (3) (note b = 0 for LR-I). Therefore,
1-6
which yields the result (6) since r1 = +l.
0
The same can be done for the LR-P scheme. Corollary 3 (LR-P Alter State): Given LR-P rewards = +1 and ~2 = -1 for actions 1 and 2, respectively, and a learning constant a that approaches 0, then the time required to alter the probability p from S to 1 -6 is t&(S) = --1 log(1 -P ) y . The maximum lag 1* is the time to reach probability q+ and,
All of the previous analysis assumes no variance in the random variable Ap because the analysis is too difficult without this assumption. We now show that this is a reasonable assumption with simulation results over five runs. The predicted and observed strategy probabilities over time of the game in Fig. 3 are plotted in Fig. 13 (assuming no  communication) . The predicted curve is based on (5) which reduces to O.O2p(l-p) for q = 0.5 and a = 0.05. The predicted q+ = 0.625 is based on (9) and the predicted lag Z* = 25.5 is based upon evaluation of (8). Note that the predicted and observed behavior completely coincide.
The expected game payoff does not include a term for the overhead, C/P. For small costs C, a local optimum for the expected net payoff occurs when the lag, P + T , equals l*.
The locally optimal P* is the slack allowed by the delay T.
by (4) , is the result (8). Jim Pilobal = 00 -00
Theorem 2 holds for both the LR-I and L R -~ schemes since we assumed that T I > r 2 2 0; however, the LR-I scheme has absorbing states. Fig. 14 shows the oscillatory behavior using the LR-1 scheme with a learning constant a = 0.05. It is similar to the LR-P results in Fig. 8 except there are stages when inaction feedback causes the probability to remain constant. Fig. 15 shows the results with a large learning constant a = 0.2. In this case, an absorbing state 0, = 1) is reached by both players and subsequent messages do not change the behavior. We consider this a severe problem in that a player may be locked into an apparently good state but then unable to respond when a dynamic environment or new communication suggests that it is now a bad state.
Let tabsorb (6) be the time until the average of both players' probabilities is within 6 of an absorbing state, e.g. E = 1 -6.
Since (4) predicts the time required to reach a particular probability, we can predict the time until absorption at the p = 1 state. Corollary 6 (Absorbing State):
For large costs C, the overhead dominates the expected net payoff and the global optimum occurs with no communication, as illustrated in Fig. 10 .
For the data in Fig. 15 , the corollary predicts tabsorb(O.O1) is 57.4 time units which agrees with the observed value of 57. In contrast, Fig. 16 shows that the LR-P scheme does not have absorbing states; when the messages arrive suggesting the opposite strategy, the DGA are able to modify their strategy. Theorem 2 and Corollaries 1,2,3,4 and 6 show results that are inversely proportional to the learning constant a as might be expected. Fig. 17 shows the effect of the learning constant values of 0.05, 0.067 and 0.1. There is a linear reduction in the period that causes the oscillations and the associated drop in the payoff.
VI. CONCLUSIONS A model has been presented which uses simple mechanisms for examining problems in distributed decision making. The effects of communication delay in distributed decision making is a high-level issue important to most, if not all, distributed applications. The model includes a factor for communication overhead such that an optimizing agent must tend to limit communication. On the other hand, given a particular environment and decision-making algorithm, Theorem 2 shows there exists a maximum communication lag 1* before decision quality
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